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Abstract 
 
This study attempts to critically assess the 
democratizing potential of “CrowdLaw,” a form of 
online participation that its practitioners describe as 
crowdsourced policy-making. To do so, the study 
analyzes both the statements of Crowdlaw practitioners 
gathered at the third “online global conference on 
#CrowdLaw” and the design and performance of the 
CrowdLaw platforms for which the author could find a 
sufficiently complete online presence. Findings about 
the democratizing potential of CrowdLaw are mixed: on 
the one hand, the analysis of practitioners’ statements 
reveals an intention to create broad participation, and 
discussion forums that encourage deliberation. On the 
other, a look at the platforms’ design and performance 
reveals an uneven and incomplete implementation of 
these intentions.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The democratizing promise of the Internet has been a 
familiar trope since the beginning of the Internet. 
Scholars have both hoped and doubted that it could act 
as an extension of the public sphere [1-4]. With digital 
technology becoming increasingly ubiquitous, initiatives 
to democratize participation have sprouted up 
everywhere in workplace or in government settings [5]. 
Some have made the case that the Internet will make 
government more democratic by making citizen 
engagement more feasible [6-8]. Others have been more 
cautious, arguing that widespread enthusiasm about the 
Internet as a magic tool to increase participation has yet 
to be followed up by any true changes in the 
participatory structure of government [5]. A large 
literature has emerged pointing out that the Internet has 
not only a decentralizing logic, but also a centralizing 
logic through its data collection and processing 
capabilities [9, 10].  
Given these debates, surprisingly little has been 
written about the bulk of these “democratizing” 
innovations that have attempted to alter existing 
decision-making structures. The writing that has 
attempted to survey some of these new approaches to 
participation usually starts from the assumption that 
Web 2.0 tools are democratizing [6, 11]. Some critical 
work on online participation systems does exist in 
academia, but it is usually on systems developed by the 
researchers themselves [12, 13]. Very little critical 
work on approaches developed outside of the academic 
setting exists yet.  
This study is an attempt to fill this gap, by 
examining a selection of projects featured in the third 
“online global conference on CrowdLaw,” a conference 
organized by the Governance Lab (or GovLab for 
short), a research lab based at NYU’s Tandon School of 
Engineering. The projects all share in common the 
same feature, which their proponents claim to be a 
democratizing innovation: a “CrowdLaw platform,” an 
online space created in order to crowdsource policy 
ideas from lay citizens. CrowdLaw, according to the 
GovLab’s website, is “open, collaborative 
crowdsourced lawmaking,” a “tech-enabled approach 
for drafting legislation or constitutions” that provides a 
channel for regular citizens to contribute to 
policymaking [14].  
Using all the evidence that could be collected on 
the CrowdLaw projects (including CrowdLaw 
practitioners’ statements that the author could find 
during and outside of the conference, and available data 
about some of the platforms’ design and performance 
that could be found online), the author scrutinizes both 
the theoretical assumptions underpinning CrowdLaw 
practitioners’ intervention, and the functioning of their 
platforms, in order to attempt to answer the question of 
whether “CrowdLaw platforms” are capable of living 
up to  their alleged democratizing potential.   
 
1.1. The CrowdLaw model  
 
The CrowdLaw projects are noteworthy because of 
the very particular position that they occupy in the 
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	network of Web 2.0 participation innovators: To begin 
with, the conference brought together projects from 
eight different countries and four different continents, 
and featured government actors, entrepreneurs, party 
representatives, think tanks, a representative from the 
U.N., and private citizens.  The GovLab, the research 
lab that featured them, is a pretty important actor in the 
open governance movement that gained some steam 
under the Obama administration: Most notably, its 
founder, Beth Noveck, was appointed the first United 
States Deputy Chief Technology Officer under 
President Obama in 2008, and the director of the White 
House Open Government Initiative (2009-2011) [6]. 
The open governance model of partipation, as Noveck 
and the GovLab see it, consists of leveraging the 
untapped expertise of citizens in order to increase the 
efficacy and legitimacy of institutions [6, 15]. The 
vision of participation that Noveck lays out in her book 
Smart Citizens, Smarter State (2015), consists largely 
of the crowdsourcing of “citizen” skills.  
However, CrowdLaw, which the Governance Lab 
defines as “open, collaborative crowdsourced 
lawmaking” [14], goes by definition beyond Noveck’s 
model of crowdsourced participation: it is hard to 
imagine providing input into a legislative process that 
wouldn’t be at least partly normative. In addition, the 
practitioners featured at the conference presented a 
model of participation that was sometimes more akin to 
deliberation than to conventional crowdsourcing. 
Deliberation is discussion with the goal of reaching a 
solution to a problem without an objective solution, 
such as a normative problem. Ideally it involves all the 
people who are governed by the decision and helps to 
find a solution that is closer to the common good [16]. 
Many theorists put strict restrictions on the nature of the 
discussion that can qualify as deliberation, but at the 
very least, it should involve the give and take of 
arguments, and the ability of participants to revise their 
opinions in light of evidence [17].  
From the outset we can note that there is at least a 
potential tension between the GovLab’s and Noveck’s 
notion of participation, and the model of participation 
that CrowdLaw practitioners seem to ascribe to. This 
study finds that CrowdLaw participants’ model of 
participation does indeed come closer to deliberation 
than to crowdsourcing, though in terms of their 
understanding of their participants and of digital 
technology as a tool to harness online participation, the 
difference from Noveck is less clear. A look at the 
platform interfaces works to additionally blur this 
distinction, and also punctures the idea that online 
platforms can be effective tools to harness participation 
in and of themselves. More importantly, the study finds 
no convincing evidence that the projects alter the 
balance of power in favor of the participants. Based on 
this, the study argues for an updated model of 
participation and for more transparency surrounding 
efforts from power holders to “democratize” 
participation.  
In the next section the study attempts to situate 
CrowdLaw within a larger movement of e-participation 
initiatives that claim to be changing existing decision-
making structures, and give a detailed description of the 
CrowdLaw platforms featured at the conference. Section 
3 presents an analysis of CrowdLaw practitioners’ 
statements and of the CrowdLaw platform interfaces. 
Section 4 will give an overview and a discussion of the 
findings, before ending with conclusions and 
recommendations.  
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. CrowdLaw in context 
 
The Governance Lab defines CrowdLaw as “open, 
collaborative crowdsourced lawmaking” [14]. 
Crowdsourcing is “an open call for anyone to participate 
in an online task” [18]. Noveck, in her book, gives a 
whole series of examples of what this crowdsourcing 
can look like, from “citizen scientists” helping to 
classify images from the Hubble Space Telescope, 
through enlisting the help of volunteers to build crisis 
maps from social media reports in an environmental 
disaster, to building software applications that keep 
databases of volunteers who can perform CPR, and can 
alert them in case of an emergency (2015) [6]. Most of 
her examples have in common that they either rely on 
people’s localized knowledge, expertise, volunteer 
labor, or a combination of the three. Crowdsourcing the 
way Noveck describes it can include examples of peer 
production, like Wikipedia. It also includes 
crowdfunding efforts like Kickstarter or Indiegogo.  
CrowdLaw distinguishes itself from most of these 
interventions in two ways: first, it seeks to crowdsource 
input from participants on their policy preferences, and 
not just their skills, knowledge, or time. And secondly, 
it departs from the unidirectional mode of input in 
traditional crowdsourcing by attempting to encourage 
dialogue on its platforms. Aitamurto and Landemore 
(2016) do perhaps the best job at characterizing the type 
of participation that CrowdLaw practitioners are trying 
to generate on their platforms: they call it crowdsourced 
deliberation, and describe it as “an open, asynchronous, 
depersonalized, and distributed kind of online 
deliberation occurring among self-selected participants 
in the context of an attempt by government or another 
organization to open up the policymaking or lawmaking 
process” (p.174) [19]. Perhaps surprisingly, the most 
prevalent kind of intervention that could qualify as 
Page 2310
	crowdsourced deliberation is crowdsourced or 
participatory constitution making.  Crowdsourced 
constitution making efforts attempt to involve the public 
in the drafting or revision of their constitution, 
sometimes in more participatory ways by allowing them 
input into the process (how binding it is is another 
matter), and sometimes in ways that seem primarily 
designed to generate buy-in in the population. Judging 
from the literature, these participatory constitution 
making processes seem to be concentrated in Arab and 
Scandinavian countries [20-22]   
 
2.2. Description of the CrowdLaw platforms 
 
The third “online global conference on CrowdLaw” 
took place on September 24th, 2015, and brought 
together nine different speakers from eight different 
countries and four different continents [23] (see Table 
1).  
 
 
Table 1. Crowdlaw Projects 
 
It featured a broad variety of different projects: 
three involving constitution review platforms deployed 
in Chile, Kurdistan, and Libya, two spearheaded by new 
political parties in Spain and Austria to give their 
supporters an online platform for policy debate, and four 
projects spearheaded by two independent think tanks in 
Brazil and Finland intended to crowdsource citizen 
suggestions on specific policy issues in order to inform 
the legislative process of their respective countries. Two 
additional projects involved politicians in New York 
City and Brazil, and were more geared toward providing 
tools to politicians to reach out to the population than to 
extending citizens’ opportunities for political 
participation, and so will not be considered in detail 
here.  
Three speakers presented projects applying two 
different online constitution review platforms, 
Legislation Lab and Icon Libya. Legislation Lab is a 
generic online platform intended to allow participants to 
review and debate over the text of a constitution (or 
other legislation) that was deployed in different places, 
including Chile and Kurdistan. Icon Libya is a more 
complex platform that was deployed in Libya in 2011, 
shortly after the fall of Gaddafi, as part of a UN effort to 
involve the Libyan population in the post-conflict 
transition. The platform allows for tiered participation, 
allowing all platform users to seek information and 
express their opinion about the constitution-drafting 
effort, and a small minority of participants to actually 
help draft the constitution, or at the very least a “civil 
society constitution.”  
The projects spearheaded by the European parties, 
Podemos in Spain and Neos in Austria, were intended to 
encourage broader citizen participation in policy 
development. Podemos and Neos are two opposition 
parties that sprung up in the wake of 2011 wave of 
protests in Europe. Both ran on a platform of extending 
and strengthening democratic participation [24, 25]. 
Podemos’ project was supported by two platforms, Plaza 
Podemos and Appgree, one of which was meant to 
provide a space for Podemos followers to deliberate, and 
the other one was designed to crowdsource policy 
proposals, and allow the public to rank them through up 
votes or down votes. The Neos party had the Neos Lab 
platform, which supports online discussion groups on 
different policy issues, and allows them to develop white 
papers on these issues.   
Finally, the projects developed by independent think 
tanks were designed to close the gap between citizens 
and government in the policy-making process, by 
crowdsourcing policy suggestions from the population 
and feeding them into the legislative process. The 
Finnish project, Open Ministry, was launched as a 
response to a constitutional amendment in 2012 that 
guaranteed crowdsourced policy proposals with 50,000 
votes or more a hearing in parliament [26]. Open 
Ministry was created to provide assistance to citizens and 
civil society organizations that needed help generating 
enough support for their proposals and ensuring a fair 
hearing for them in parliament. The Brazilian think 
thank Institute for Technology and Society Rio 
developed three platforms, Marco Civil, Plataforma 
Brasil, and Mudamos, to crowdsource popular input on 
specific policy issues. The Marco Civil platform was 
meant to elicit popular feedback on Internet policy, and 
was deployed as part of the process that resulted in the 
passage of the “Marco Civil da Internet” legislation in 
Project 
name 
Presenter  Country of 
application 
Included 
in the 
analysis? 
Legislation 
Lab  
Tarik Nesh Nash, 
platform developer 
Morocco, 
Kurdistan, 
Somalia,  
yes 
Constitucion 
de Todos 
Daniela Hirsch Chile yes 
Platform 
Libya 
Sean Deely, UN Libya yes 
Neos Lab  Joseph Lentsch, 
member of Neos party 
academy 
Austria yes 
Podemos Victoria Alsina, visiting 
scholar at Harvard 
Spain yes 
/ Ben Kallos (NYC 
councilmember) 
United 
States 
no 
Hacker Lab  Cristiano Ferri, 
Brazilian house of 
representatives 
Brazil no 
Open 
Ministry  
Joonas Pekkanen, 
platform developer  
Finland yes 
Marco Civil, 
Plataforma 
Brasil, 
Mudamos 
Ronaldo Lemos, from the 
think tank Instituto de 
Tecnologia & Sociedade 
do Rio 
Brazil yes 
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	2014 [27], and the Plataforma Brasil and Mudamos 
platforms were meant to elicit feedback on issues of 
political reform and public security.    
 
3. Analysis  
 
This section will go over the available evidence to tell 
whether CrowdLaw lives up to its democratizing 
potential. Section 3.1 will go over practitioners’ 
discourse about CrowdLaw, and section 3.2 will review 
existing CrowdLaw platform interfaces.  
 
3.1. What practitioners tell us about CrowdLaw 
 
3.1.1. Method of discourse analysis. To gain a more 
critical understanding of the CrowdLaw model of online 
participation, and of its potential to democratize the 
process of legislation drafting, the study starts by 
examining the conference participants’ discourse on 
CrowdLaw, in order, on the one hand, to tease out 
practitioners’ understandings of what CrowdLaw is and 
is meant to achieve, and on the other, to relate these 
understandings to academic models of online 
participation, and broader scholarly theory on 
democracy and the Internet.  
The author started by partially transcribing the 
statements of the seven participants whom she judged to 
be presenting on online participation platforms, focusing 
on statements about who the platform was meant to 
reach, and what kind of participation they wanted the 
platform to support, as well as how digital technology 
was believed to contribute to any of these things. The 
author then iteratively went through the transcribed 
statements and tried to identify the core arguments made 
by the participants. Once a core argument was 
identified, the author went through all the transcribed 
statements again and tried to pick out all the statements 
making that argument, as well as all the statements 
making a contradictory argument.  
The findings were supplemented with two different 
types of supporting evidence: two pieces of outside 
writing by conference participants on the topic of 
CrowdLaw (one by Lemos et al. (2014) [28] about the 
Marco Civil platform, and another by Deely and Nesh 
Nash (2014) [29], the speakers for Icon Libya and 
Legislation Lab, on my.con, another constitution 
drafting platform), and the mission statements on the 
Marco Civil and Neos Lab websites.  
 
3.1.2. CrowdLaw participants according to 
practitioners. The statements of CrowdLaw 
practitioners reveal that they think of the question “who 
do we want to include in our platforms?” ways that are 
broadly consistent with Noveck’s model of 
crowdsourced online participation:  in terms of the types 
of people that they want to involve in their online 
participation platforms, who they are generally stays 
undefined, or they are simply called “citizens” (Nesh 
Nash, Alsina, Pekkanen). Among the speakers, there is 
also an understanding that they want to extend 
participation to citizens who weren’t previously 
involved in the policy-making process: Lentsch, from 
the Neos Lab, speaks of a “mission to find a different 
approach to politics, to make it more open - as an open 
laboratory for new politics” (29:20). Other speakers 
don’t make their goal of extending citizen participation 
through technology explicit, but it is apparent, for 
example, in Alsina’s and Pekkanen’s citing of their 
usage statistics: Alsina claims that 15,000 people 
regularly use Plaza Podemos, while Pekkanen mentions 
that Open Ministry was involved in six out of the 
thirteen initiatives that reached the 50,000 vote 
threshold.  
The speakers also share Noveck’s and her research 
lab’s assumption that digital technology is the tool of 
choice to harness this kind of participation. Lemos, for 
example, thinks of technology as a tool to promote civic 
participation. Nesh Nash echoes some of Noveck’s 
bolder claims about the disruptive potential of digital 
technology to change our mode of governance:  
 
We believe that Legislation Lab could be a powerful 
tool for participatory democracy (…) We feel we are 
on the verge of this disruptive change, that's had the 
role of closing this important gap between the 
governments and the public, to strengthen the culture 
of the rule of law (7:20 of the Crowdlaw conference).  
 
But at another moment, Nesh Nash acknowledges the 
limitations of his online platform for generating 
participation, speaking of the need to supplement it with 
a mobile presence, for example. Deely speaks of the 
necessity to supplement the online platform with a 
multi-media campaign and in-person consultations and 
negotiations . Lemos et al. (2014), in their description of 
the Marco Civil process, make the same argument [28]. 
So while the practitioners express the same optimism 
about the potential of digital technology to extend 
political participation as Noveck does, some of them 
also acknowledge some limitations that the online 
format can have.  
It is also interesting to note that when practitioners 
do define who the “citizens” are to whom they want to 
extend participation, some important differences 
emerge: For Hirsch, from La Constitucion de Todos, 
involving more people in the policy making process 
means not having the process confined to experts:  
 
What I'd like to see is it becomes a little bit more 
common sense that anyone can participate in the 
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	lawmaking process and legislation process, that it's not 
just for specialists or just for legislators (2:00:30).  
 
Deely, on the other hand, puts a similar emphasis as 
Noveck on expertise, describing Icon Libya as a tiered 
participation system, where everyone can go to inform 
themselves and testify on their own experience, but only 
a few technical experts and advocates can contribute to 
the drafting of the constitution, or the civil society 
version of the constitution. And both Deely, speaking 
about Icon Libya, and Lemos et al. (2014), writing about 
Marco Civil, describe a multi-stakeholder policy-
making process, where only one of the stakeholders is 
civil society, and other stakeholders include NGOs and 
universities for Icon Libya, and corporate and 
government actors in the case of Marco Civil [28].  
One other notion of who are the intended 
participants surfaces in Nesh Nash’s and Deely’s 
remarks: Nesh Nash mentions an application of 
Legislation Lab in Kurdistan, where the platform is 
meant to help “ a minority rights group (…) deal with 
the tyranny of the majority” (8:10). And Deely makes 
the argument that the online format allows minority 
groups and women to participate in the constitution-
making process in a way that they couldn’t if they had 
to go to a public event. Both seem to gesture at a 
pluralist model of participation that emphasizes equal 
access to political power for different groups in society 
[16, 30]. Deely and Nesh Nash adopt the pluralist model 
more clearly in the article they co-authored about 
my.con in 2014:  
 
Self-selecting representatives of civil society 
organizations representing minorities, people with 
disabilities or other traditionally marginalized groups 
or communities, and people with specific expertise can 
be invited to contribute to the drafting of particular 
provisions or articles or to provide feedback on drafts 
prepared by the responsible thematic committee or 
subcommittee (p.11) [29]  
 
In summary, while most of the time practitioners 
remain vague about who they mean by “CrowdLaw 
participants,” when they do specify it more clearly, it 
becomes apparent that their understanding of it is not 
straightforward, and that they may not be in agreement 
about what that understanding is: Some of the time, 
when speakers specify in more detail who their 
participants are, their views align with those of 
Noveck’s, as when they see their platform’s role as 
tapping into society’s latent expertise. Sometimes, their 
understanding of their participants is arguably more 
democratic than Noveck’s, as when they draw on 
egalitarian or pluralist notions of participation. But at 
other times, their description of their own platforms 
reveals a tiered participation system that is 
undemocratic.  
 
3.1.3. The CrowdLaw model of participation 
according to practitioners. So far, we’ve seen that 
practitioners’ notions about who their intended 
participants are, and how technology contributes to 
reaching them, largely overlap with Noveck’s, with a 
few exceptions. In terms of the model of participation 
that CrowdLaw practitioners are trying to achieve, 
we’ve already seen that it deviates from Noveck’s in 
two important way: First, because by definition it 
crowdsources normative input from participants. 
Second, because while the platforms incorporated some 
traditional crowdsourcing elements, with the exception 
of Open Ministry, all but one of the projects considered 
in this paper included a platform intended to facilitate 
discussion.  
The CrowdLaw practitioners’ statements mirror this 
departure from Noveck’s model: Some of the speakers 
do refer to approaches that resemble traditional 
crowdsourcing: Deely, for example, speaks of a feature 
on the Icon Libya platform that would allow participants 
to upload 30-second videos of themselves, the best of 
which could be stitched together to present to drafters at 
the end of the constitution process. Alsina describes 
Appgree, one of the platforms used by Podemos, as 
designed to crowdsource proposals and rank them 
through up or down votes.  
But both speakers also describe online discussion 
forums as part of their projects, and most of the 
practitioners’ statements about the nature of the 
participation on their platforms are more consistent 
with political deliberation: for example, Alsina 
describes Plaza Podemos as “a place of contact and 
debate for all followers of Podemos in order to share 
their thoughts and ideas” (37:15). And Nesh Nash 
describes Reforme.ma, the precursor to Legislation Lab, 
as “a platform that allowed citizens to analyze and 
discuss the text of the constitution” (6:00). Lemos et al. 
(2014) even referred to the type of participation they 
were trying to achieve on Marco Civil as “deliberation” 
(p.4).  
The nature of the debate, discussion or deliberation 
that practitioners were trying to generate on their 
platforms is not theorized during the conference, but a 
look at Deely and Nesh Nash’s (2014) writing outside 
of the conference betrays an influence of deliberative 
theory that is unmistakable. For instance, they write:  
 
[Public debate] contributes to reconciling different 
points of view (…) Through informed discussion and 
debate citizens test and challenge the opinions and 
arguments of others, and may be compelled to accept a 
particular conclusion (p.8) [26].  
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	The properties they attribute to public debate bear some 
resemblance to the properties attributed by Chambers to 
deliberation:  
 
Deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at 
producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which 
participants are willing to revise preferences in light of 
discussion, new information, and claims made by 
fellow participants (p.309) [31].  
 
In addition, Deely and Nesh Nash (2014) write:  
 
Debated in public, the worth of different options can be 
seen by the strength of the arguments supporting them 
rather than which proposals are supported by the most 
powerful representative or the largest number of people 
(p.8) [29]. 
 
This argument strongly resembles Habermas’ notion of 
the “forceless force of the better argument,” which is 
the only form of influence accepted in his ideal speech 
situation (p.108) [32].  
In summary, while practitioners’ notion of who their 
platforms are meant to reach aligns with Noveck’s 
overall, the model of participation they are trying to 
achieve is different from hers: while many of the 
CrowdLaw platforms integrate some elements that are 
consistent with Noveck’s crowdsourcing model, a core 
design feature of most of the platforms is a discussion 
forum. Additionally, many of the practitioners see the 
forum’s core function as facilitating deliberation, or at 
least a kind of discussion that resembles deliberation.  
This section has looked at practitioners’ intentions 
regarding how inclusive their platforms are supposed to 
be, and the type of participation they are supposed to 
generate. The following section will consider the 
available evidence to see how well their platforms 
actually deliver on these intentions.  
 
3.2. What platform design and performance tell 
us about CrowdLaw 
 
3.2.1. Method of platform analysis. As evidence of the 
platforms’ performance, the author relied on two 
platforms, Legislation Lab [33] and Mudamos [34] that 
actually tracked their user statistics on their platforms. 
This was supplemented with more basic information 
that the Neos Lab [35] provided about the number of 
participants in each of its forums.  
To paint a picture of the platforms’ design, the 
author relied on the CrowdLaw platforms described by 
the practitioners that had a discoverable online presence, 
and were in a language that the author could understand, 
or translate. Three platforms fit this description: 
Legislation Lab, Neos Lab and Mudamos. The study 
also made some inferences about two other platform that 
had only a partial presence (Marco Civil [36]) or no 
discoverable presence online (Icon Libya), based on 
statements the author could find on the platform’s 
design. In the case of Marco Civil, these inferences were 
drawn both from Lemos’ description of the platform at 
the conference, and from additional descriptions of the 
platform that the author found on Marco Civil’s home 
page, while in the case of Icon Libya, the author relied 
exclusively on Deely’s descriptions at the conference, 
which were quite detailed.  
 
3.2.2. What platform performance tells us about how 
inclusive CrowdLaw is. Going off of the available 
evidence, the track record for inclusivity is pretty 
dismal. Even by Noveck’s standard of generating high 
participation, Crowdlaw platforms fail spectacularly: 
While according to Tarik Nesh Nash, 200,000 people 
visited his website Reforme.ma in Morocco (the 
prototype for Legislation Lab) within two months of the 
launch of the platform, according to the Legislation 
Lab’s user statistics, the participation numbers are much 
humbler. The policy text on the platform that attracted 
the most user participation (the Chilean constitution) 
drew only fifty-five participants, and 243 comments for 
129 articles. Mudamos and the Neos Lab fare only 
slightly better. Ronaldo Lemos, when describing 
Plataforma Brasil, the precursor to Mudamos, reported 
at the conference that the platform received 
approximately 35,000 votes. But the user statistics for 
Mudamos only show a participation rate of 250 people. 
The Neos Lab’s website does not display comprehensive 
user statistics, but a look at their website’s list of 
roughly one hundred theme groups reveals that about 
one third of them have only one participant, while only 
about one fifth of them have more than ten participants 
(with the largest rate of participation for any one group 
being forty-five people). These numbers seem roughly 
consistent with the platform’s spokesperson’s self-report 
of a few hundred participants.  
Judging by the available demographic data that 
Legislation Lab and Mudamos provided, the platforms 
fail even more starkly at achieving a few of the 
practitioners’ aspiration of creating representative 
participation and expanding participation to excluded 
groups: of the participants contributing feedback to the 
Chilean constitution on Legislation Lab, only 17% of 
the participants were female, and on Mudamos, that 
proportion was 14%. In addition, over fifty percent of 
contributors to Mudamos’ discussion about public 
security came from the public security sector. The 
discussion on La Constitucion de Todos also likely 
attracted many participants that were not concerned in 
first line by the question of Chilean constitutional 
reform, because close to a quarter of contributors were 
from outside Chile.  
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	3.2.3. What platform design tells us about the 
CrowdLaw model of participation. The available data 
on platform use and participant demographics reveal 
that the CrowdLaw platforms do not seem to be the 
intrinsic tools to generate online participation that 
CrowdLaw practitioners often expect them to be. How 
well then do they succeed in really creating the model of 
participation that they describe in their statements?   
The author finds from analyzing the available 
evidence on the five platforms mentioned in section 
3.2.1. that the platforms seem to fall broadly into two 
types in terms of the model of participation that they 
encourage: The first type, comprised of Legislation Lab, 
Marco Civil, and Mudamos, is made up of simple 
platforms constructed around the single function of 
soliciting popular input on a single legal text. According 
to Lemos, and Lemos et al. (2014), the Marco Civil and 
Mudamos platforms are slightly more complex, in that 
they elicit input from participants in several phases, first 
on a white paper, then on the text of legislation, and that 
the type of input elicited is different at different phases 
[28]. But all three platforms have in common that at any 
given phase the type of participation facilitated is single-
tiered: in other words, all participants accessing the 
platform are given the same opportunities to participate.  
On the other hand, the design of the platforms of 
the second type (Neos Lab and Icon Libya) is much 
more complex, incorporating multiple functions, and 
their participation model is two-tiered: the majority of 
participants are only able to submit input in a way that is 
discrete and unidirectional, similarly to traditional 
crowdsourcing. Only a minority of participants has 
access to more complex tasks like deliberating or 
contributing to the drafting of legal documents.  
 
 
Figure 1. Legislation Lab interface 
 
Legislation Lab (fig. 1) is the simplest of all three 
platforms: it has a very simple design, which allows 
users to leave comments, vote, or edit small sections of 
a law or petition, and to navigate between those sections 
using a menu. The voting feature is consistent with 
traditional crowdsourcing, but in theory, the platform 
also allows for deliberation, because of the comment 
and editing features. However, the way the platform is 
designed also fragments discussion by structuring the 
comments around small sections of a legislative text, 
instead of through an open forum or around broader 
topics. In addition, the potential for communication is 
limited in the revision feature, because, while it does 
allow for comments to be made under an edited piece of 
text, it requires participants to click on the profile 
picture of an editor in order to see the edited version of 
the text. This limits the extent to which the editing of the 
law or petition can become a communicative or 
collaborative process.  
The basic input structure of the Marco Civil and 
Mudamos is the same as that of the Legislation Lab – 
comments that can be appended to each paragraph of a 
legal text – thus, with the possibility for communication, 
but not deliberation-friendly in design. However, in 
contrast to Legislation Lab, both Marco Civil and 
Mudamos incorporate opportunities for communication 
between participants into their design, albeit 
peripherally, by redirecting longer comments or 
comment strings to independent discussion forums. That 
said, as with Legislation Lab, the platforms only allow 
participants to provide feedback on the law, and not to 
shape the text of the law directly.  
In summary, what can be said about all three 
platforms is that they allow for fairly equal 
participation, but limit participants’ freedom to choose 
the terms of their involvement, and their opportunity to 
participate in online discussions. While the Marco Civil 
and Mudamos platforms do incorporate some discussion 
forums into their platform, these forums are only a 
peripheral part of their design.     
In contrast, the platforms in the second group, Neos 
Lab and Icon Libya, allow participants to contribute 
directly to the drafting of legislation: For example, the 
Neos Lab allows some participants to join theme groups 
where they can participate in discussions and 
collectively draft white papers that are then posted on 
the website, under the rubric “Aktuelle Begutachtung” 
(Under current review). And the platform of Icon Libya 
has a section called “Write the constitution,” where 
participants can either edit the text of the actual 
constitution or contribute to the drafting of an informal 
“civil constitution.” 
However, this function is only available to a 
minority of users: In the case of Neos Lab (fig. 2), 
participants can only join the theme group discussions 
by contacting the group moderators and getting vetted 
by them. In the case of Icon Libya, this type of 
participation is for the most part only open to experts, 
according to Deely. For the majority of users on both 
platforms, the opportunities provided by the design to 
submit input are decidedly more aggregative: In the case 
of the Neos Lab, the platform allows three main avenues 
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	for general input: submitting a suggestion form, 
submitting an inquiry form, and commenting on white 
papers put out by the discussion groups. Even then, an 
examination of the comments reveals that most are from 
participants in the theme groups, or people affiliated 
with the party. In the case of Icon Libya, general 
feedback comes mostly in the form of short videos 
uploaded by users to the platform, which according to 
Deely will then be used to create a video to present to 
the constitution drafters.   
 
 
Figure 2. Neos Lab interface: Economy theme 
group 
 
In summary, while the Neos Lab and Icon Libya do 
a better job than their counterparts at fostering an open 
discussion between some of their participants, these 
participants only constitute a minority of the users of the 
platform, making these features on the platforms look 
less like a democratic innovation and more like a 
privilege.  
In sum, if we compare the five platforms’ 
performance with CrowdLaw practitioners’ stated goals 
for their platforms’ performance, we find that none of 
them quite succeed in conforming to practitioners’ 
stated intention: While many practitioners see their 
platforms as a space to facilitate deliberation, or at least 
a kind of discussion resembling deliberation, their 
platforms for the most part only facilitate discussion in a 
superficial way, and for the most part do not incorporate 
any design features intended to facilitate a deeper and 
more rule-based discussion – and when they do provide 
opportunities for more deliberative discussion, this type 
of participation is limited to a minority of vetted 
participants, who tend to be insiders already.   
 
4. Discussion & Conclusion 
 
Proponents of CrowdLaw have made the case 
that it constitutes a democratizing innovation. This 
study asks whether CrowdLaw platforms actually live 
up to their democratizing potential. To answer this 
question, this study considers both the breadth and 
scope of participation that CrowdLaw practitioners 
want to generate and how they are actualized on the 
platforms.  
The analysis found discrepancies between 
practitioners’ statements and the actual functioning and 
interface of the platforms both in breadth and scope. In 
terms of breadth, practitioners made the assumption that 
CrowdLaw platforms would naturally attract high 
participation, and claimed participation numbers as 
high as 15,000 on their platforms, but available data on 
platform usage shows participation rates that never 
exceeded 250 people. In terms of scope of participation, 
for the most part practitioners agreed that they wanted 
to encourage discussion between participants on their 
platforms. Some even thought of the discussion they 
wanted to create in ways that were consistent with 
deliberation. A look at the actual platforms showed that 
most of them did indeed have features that allowed 
participants to have online conversations. But the 
analysis did not reveal any features that would move 
superficial online conversations to more deliberative 
ones; while some CrowdLaw practitioners did 
formulate some requirements on the type of 
conversation they wanted to encourage, these did not 
seem to translate into their design.  
In addition to the discrepancies between 
practitioners’ statements and platforms’ performance, 
the analysis uncovered the following thing: 
participants’ notion of who the participants were that 
they were trying to reach seemed undertheorized, and 
when practitioners did define who they were, it became 
clear that they were not of one mind: some wanted to 
make participation more representative or more 
egalitarian, explicitly stating the intention to extend 
participation to “non-experts”, while others specifically 
targeted experts. Some even described a tiered model of 
participation, where experts and other types of insiders 
could have access to more expansive forms of 
participation, while the rest of participants only had 
access to a narrower, usually one-directional form of 
participation, more in line with conventional 
crowdsourcing.   
 
4.1. Who participates on CrowdLaw platforms? 
 
Judging from the available data, CrowdLaw 
platforms do nothing in and of themselves to generate 
democratic participation, much less representative 
democratic participation. The failure of the CrowdLaw 
platforms in this study to generate anything resembling 
robust participation stands as a stark reminder of a 
ubiquitous reality that is often overshadowed by our 
everyday experience of Internet virality: while in theory 
the Internet connects everyone who has an Internet 
connection, in most cases having an online presence 
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	expands one’s reach only insignificantly without 
recourse to other (and in many cases much more time-
tested) means of generating participation. This 
phenomenon has been amply demonstrated by 
quantitative researchers: for example, Goel, Watts and 
colleagues find that less than 3% of individual 
communications on the Internet spread to more than 
four people, and mass media is still overwhelmingly 
responsible for the diffusion of what we think of as 
“viral” content on the Internet [37, 38]. 
CrowdLaw practitioners, when they obscure the low 
participation levels on their platforms, and to a lesser 
extent the GovLab and Noveck, when they treat the 
Internet as a kind of silver bullet for harnessing popular 
participation, misrepresent the contribution CrowdLaw 
platforms are capable of making to democracy. That 
said, the idea that CrowdLaw platforms could be a 
“democratic innovation” need not be discarded 
altogether. Other ways of recruiting participants have 
been deployed successfully to achieve representative 
participation (at least up to a point), and if they were 
employed in concert with a CrowdLaw platform, the 
question still remains whether the model of 
participation enacted on the platform could be 
considered a democratic advance. 
 
4.2. What is the CrowdLaw model of 
participation?  
 
So should the model of participation on CrowdLaw 
platforms be considered a democratic advance? 
According to Cohen (1998), a democratic model of 
participation should give people bound by a collective 
decision an equal chance to influence that decision [39]. 
While any actual system is bound to fall short of this 
principle, we can ask whether the CrowdLaw model 
succeeds or could potentially succeed in creating a 
system that brings us closer to this ideal.   
Let’s begin by considering the GovLab’s definition 
of CrowdLaw as simply crowdsourced lawmaking, 
without including a mechanism for online deliberation.  
A mechanism for online deliberation is not part of its 
definition. Should we feel satisfied that such a model 
could extend democratic participation? I would argue 
that no: if CrowdLaw was reduced to crowdsourcing 
participant feedback on policy, it would be tough to 
distinguish from polling, but with smaller and less 
representatives samples.  
What makes the CrowdLaw model interesting is 
that, according to practitioners’ understanding of it, it 
includes a mechanism for online discussion, perhaps 
even deliberation. Deliberation has been identified by a 
variety of theorists and researchers as a mechanism that 
can extend democratic participation: because it allows 
for more informed decision-making, encourages 
participants to revise their positions to move closer to 
the common good, provides them with the knowledge 
they need to better exercise their rights and duties as 
citizens, confers more legitimacy to decisions, and 
strives to reach a solution that is acceptable to all 
participants, not just to a majority [16, 17, 30, 32, 39, 
40].  
Researchers have similarly written about the 
benefits of online deliberation. While the Internet is far 
from being the magic tool for generating participation 
that CrowdLaw practitioners and the GovLab have 
made it out to be, it is still a powerful way of erasing 
spatial boundaries between people who want to be 
connected (at least on the digital side of the digital 
divide). Iyengar, Luskin and Fishkin (2003) argue that 
online deliberation can significantly cut the time and 
cost of face-to-face deliberation [41]. And they also 
find, along with other researchers, that online 
deliberation successfully approximates face-to-face 
deliberation [17, 42, 43]. 
However, a look at the actual platform interfaces 
reveals that, while they do allow participants to have 
discussion, they do not reveal many design features that 
could encourage participants to have discussions that are 
closer to deliberation. More fundamentally, of all the 
projects that could credibly have an impact on the policy 
making process, Podemos and Open Ministry were the 
only one that showed no evidence of violating Cohen’s 
(1998) principle of equal influence [39] – and that might 
have been because the Podemos and Open Ministry 
platforms could not be included in the analysis. All 
others showed evidence of a tiered participation model, 
either in the platform interfaces (Neos Lab and Icon 
Libya) or in the descriptions of the practitioners at the 
conference (Icon Libya, Marco Civil, Plataforma Brasil, 
Mudamos). There is also a more fundamental problem 
with some of the platforms that would probably be 
difficult to address through design changes: this is the 
problem of the tiered model of participation the author 
found on the platforms Neos Lab and Icon Libya, and 
also noted in the Brazilian projects.  
That Neos Lab and Icon Libya restricted the 
opportunities for discussion and legal drafting to a 
minority of participants, and that the important 
discussion and decision-making happened off of the 
Brazilian platforms, is a sign that existing power holders 
may be less willing to cede control to citizens than they 
would like people to believe. At the same time, there is 
also evidence that it may be inherently difficult, even 
impossible to scale deliberation the same way as more 
conventional crowdsourcing inputs. Mansbridge (1983) 
notes that the larger the size of the group trying to reach 
a decision through deliberation, the less likely that the 
communicative conditions required for deliberation will 
be met [16]. In addition, the more diverse the 
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	deliberative group’s interests are, the more likely an 
attempt at deliberation is to lead to coercion [16, 44]. 
All this suggests that perhaps we should not expect 
platforms like the Neos Lab and Icon Libya to scale 
deliberation to their entire platform. Rather, if we want 
to create deliberative platforms that allow for equal 
participation, we might want to create smaller platforms, 
and deploy them in a more local context. Moreover, 
following most empirical research on deliberation, we 
might want to be wary of taking a one-size-fits-all 
approach to deploying deliberative CrowdLaw 
platforms that ignores the particularities of the local 
context [17]. 
 
4.3. Is crowdsourced deliberation a promising 
model to extend democratic participation?   
  
So far, we’ve seen that there isn’t much evidence 
that CrowdLaw as it’s done in practice really constitutes 
a democratizing innovation. But if online deliberation 
can’t be scaled, what does this tell us about the potential 
of crowdsourced deliberation in general to extend 
democratic participation?  
There is one reason the CrowdLaw model shouldn’t 
necessarily be discarded in favor of online deliberation: 
Aitamurto (2016), writing about what she calls 
“crowdsourced democratic deliberation,” points out that 
one of its defining characteristics is that it is embedded 
in a larger process of policymaking, or at least gathering 
information for policymaking [45]. While not all the 
platforms I analyzed conformed to this criteria 
(Legislation Lab, as far as I can tell, is completely 
unmoored from any policymaking process), most 
platforms demonstrate a remarkably diverse integration 
into the larger policymaking process, demonstrating 
their versatility:  Icon Libya, for example, was a UN-
based effort, and fostered connections to universities, 
NGOs, and other forms of civil societies, according to 
its spokesperson Sean Deely. The negotiation of the 
Marco Civil involved a complex network of 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders [23, 
46], while the Neos Lab platform is directly connected 
to the legislative process through the nine seats its party 
holds in parliament [47]. 
This study only opens a small window into the 
world of e-participation interventions that are allegedly 
remaking the policy-making process. More research is 
needed in order to get an overview of the types of 
efforts that are occurring in this area. More in-depth 
research is also required in order to understand the 
effect of these interventions on the policy-making 
process, and the factors (like design choices, integration 
into the policy-making process) that moderate that 
effect. Hopefully what this study could show is that this 
is an area well worth looking into: both to keep the 
people honest who claim to use technology for 
democratic ends, and to apply the insights we can draw 
from academic work on democracy and the social 
capabilities of the Internet to contribute to the work of 
actually making our society more democratic.  
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